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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to understand the current status of nuclear
disarmament and survey the future possible courses of nuclear disarmament on the
basis of an examination of the arguments during the 2015 NPT Review
Conference. First, I will evaluate the implementation of nuclear disarmament
undertakings for the last five years and consider the two most eminent topics in
this Conference: the humanitarian approach to nuclear disarmament and the legal
framework for a world without nuclear weapons.
Second, I will examine concrete measures for nuclear disarmament: reduction
of nuclear weapons, reduction of the role of nuclear weapons, de-alerting and
response to nuclear risk, negative security assurances and nuclear-weapon-free
zones, comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, fissile material cut-off treaty,
transparency and regular reporting, and disarmament and non-proliferation
education.
Third, I will study four main challenges to a world without nuclear weapons:
U.S.-Russia relations, forum for nuclear disarmament negotiation, humanitarian
concerns and security, and how to advance nuclear disarmament.
Although the 2015 NPT Review Conference failed to adopt a final document
by consensus, the arguments during the Conference and the Draft Final Document
by the President provide us plenty of information to understand the current status
of the important issues and survey the future possible courses of nuclear
disarmament.
I Introduction
The Review Conference of the Parties of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was held at the Headquarters of the United Nations in
New York from April 27 to May 22, 2015. Compared with the situation during the
last Review Conference in 2010, the circumstances surrounding nuclear weapons
and nuclear disarmament have become much worse. Mainly because of the sharp
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confrontation on the Ukraine issue between the Russian Federation and the United
States along with other NATO states, the negotiations on nuclear disarmament
between the two nuclear superpowers have completely stopped. In fact, Russia has
pursued a policy of emphasizing the military and political value of nuclear
weapons by contemplating an up-grade of its nuclear preparedness. This is a
complete reversal away from the agreement of the 2010 Review Conference in
which the Russian government said it would work towards reducing the role of
nuclear weapons in its military strategy.
Furthermore, no conference has been held on establishing a Middle East zone
free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, which was one
of the main agreements that assured the consensus acceptance of the 2010 final
document. This situation angers Arab states and increases their frustration. In
addition, in spite of the agreement in 2010 by the nuclear-weapon states that they
would reduce the role of nuclear weapons and take policies pursuing a world
without nuclear weapons, all are reportedly modernizing their nuclear arsenals and
maintaining their traditional posture that their security heavily depends on nuclear
weapons.
The Conference could not agree on the Draft Final Document1) submitted by
the President of the Conference, because a few states opposed the part about the
Middle East. However, it is generally conceived that there was a general consensus
in other parts of the Draft Final Document, including the part dealing with nuclear
disarmament.
Under these circumstances, one of the most significant improvements in the
last five years is the development of a “humanitarian approach to nuclear
disarmament”. In the final document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference2), the
Conference expressed its deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian
consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and reaffirmed the need for all states
at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international
humanitarian law. On the basis of this statement, the Conferences on the
Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons were held in Oslo (March 2013),
Nayarit (February 2014), and Vienna (December 2014), and various joint
statements on the humanitarian dimension of nuclear weapons were delivered. In
1) 2015 NPT Review Conference, Draft Final Document, Volume I, NPT/CONF.2015/R.3, 21
May 2015.
2) 2010 NPT Review Conference, Final Document, Volume I, NPT/CONF.2010/50(Vol.1), 18
June 2010.
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both cases, the number of participating states has increased.
The other improvement is the efforts to establish the necessary framework to
achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons, including negotiations on
a nuclear weapons convention or agreement on a framework of separate mutually
reinforcing instruments as is written in the 2010 final documents. The issues about
how to proceed with nuclear disarmament have been widely discussed.
II Discussions on Nuclear Disarmament in General
1 Nuclear Disarmament: 2010-2015
Evaluation by States at the Conference
The United States stated that “The United States is unequivocally committed to
disarm. We have and we will continue to scale down our arsenals, and to continue
to move, step by step, toward nuclear disarmament. We have pledged not to pursue
new nuclear warheads and we haven’t tested a nuclear weapon in 23 years. We
have reduced the role that nuclear weapons play in our national security strategy.
We have reduced the alert status of our nuclear arsenal.3)”
The Russian Federation stated that “Russia consistently implements all the
provisions of the NPT, including Article VI. We have reduced our nuclear arsenal
to a minimal level. Russia is strongly committed to the goal of nuclear
disarmament. A vivid demonstration of that is our consistent implementation of the
New START Treaty. We are ready to discuss nuclear disarmament issues in the
most serious and meaningful way.4)”
The United Kingdom stated that “The United Kingdom remains firmly
committed to step-by-step disarmament, and our obligations under Article Six. We
announced in January that we have reduced the number of warheads on each of
our deployed ballistic missile submarines from 48 to 40, and the number of
operational missiles on each of those submarines to no more than eight.5)”
France stated that “As regards disarmament, France shares the long-term
objective of eliminating nuclear weapons, when the circumstances so allow. It has
consistently demonstrated this objective over the 15 years by halving its total
weapons stockpile and dismantling its nuclear test site and fissile-material
3) 2015 NPT Review Conference, General Debate, Statement by the United States, 27 April
2015.
4) 2015 NPT Review Conference, General Debate, Statement by the Russian Federation, 27
April 2015.
5) NPT Review Conference, General Debate, Statement by the United Kingdom, 27 April 2015.
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production facilities for weapons.6)”
China stated that “China, as a staunch champion for nuclear disarmament,
stands for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons
and has faithfully fulfilled its nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty.7)”
The five legally recognized nuclear-weapon states (P5) stated as a group that
“As detailed in our respective national reports to the 2015 Review Conference,
there has been very substantive progress on Article VI. The Cold War nuclear arms
race has ended. Global stocks of nuclear weapons are at their lowest point in over
half century as the result of unprecedented efforts on the part of the nuclear-
weapon states. When fully implemented, the New START Treaty will result in the
lowest number of deployed nuclear weapons in the United States and Russia since
the 1950s.8)”
The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) stated that “On
disarmament, we welcome steps taken so far by the nuclear-weapon states,
including by the Russian Federation and the United States under the New START
Treaty, which is being implemented in spite of the current difficult political
climate. But there are still more than 16,000 nuclear warheads in existence today,
many on high alert.9)”
The New Agenda Coalition (NAC) stated that “Today, while the non-
proliferation pillar of the Treaty has worked well in limiting the horizontal
proliferation of nuclear weapons and the non-proliferation provisions and
obligations under the Treaty have been strengthened, the commitments embodied
in the disarmament pillar of the NPT remain unfulfilled.10)” The New Agenda
Coalition continues to reject attempts to assert a right to indefinite possession of
nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon states or to justify the continued retention
of nuclear weapon on security grounds11).
The Group of Non-aligned Movement (NAM) States stated that “The nuclear-
6) NPT Review Conference, General Debate, Statement by France, 27 April 2015.
7) 2015 NPT Review Conference, General Debate, Statement by China, 27 April 2015.
8) 2015 NPT Review Conference, General Debate, Statement by the Five Nuclear-Weapon
States, 30 April 2015.
9) 2015 NPT Review Conference, General Debate, Statement by The Netherlands on behalf of
the NPDI (Non-proliferation and Disarmament Initiative), 27 April 2015.
10) 2015 NPT Review Conference, General Debate, Statement by New Zealand on behalf of the
NAC(New Agenda Coalition), 27 April 2015.
11) 2015 NPT Review Conference, Working Paper by the NAC, Taking Forward Nuclear
Disarmament, NPT/CONF.2015/WP.8, 9 March 2015.
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weapon states have not made progress in eliminating their nuclear weapons. The
role of nuclear weapons in security policies of the nuclear-weapon states has not
diminished. Some nuclear-weapon states are modernizing their nuclear arsenals
and planning research on new nuclear warheads, others have announced their
intention to develop new delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons. We express deep
concern at the continued lack of progress in the implementation of nuclear
disarmament obligations and commitments by the nuclear-weapon states.12)”
During the process of discussion, the first draft13) submitted by the Chairman
of Subsidiary Body I included the following paragraph:
4 While acknowledging that some progress has been made in implementing
disarmament commitments since the 2010 Review Conference, the Conference
recognizes that greater and accelerated implementation efforts are required,
particularly on the part of the nuclear-weapon states, including through the
specification of concrete benchmarks and agreed timelines.
The fourth draft14) submitted by the Chairman of Main Committee I included
the following paragraph:
8 The Conference recognizes that the slow pace of the implementation of
nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments, concerns over breaches of
the Treaty’s obligations and the lack of universality, undermine confidence in
the Treaty.
However, the draft final document submitted by the President of the
Conference includes no reference to the overall evaluation on the implementation
of the nuclear disarmament obligations by the nuclear-weapon states.
As is clear from the statements of the states, there are various evaluations of
the progress in nuclear disarmament. According to the nuclear-weapon states,
progress in nuclear disarmament is good enough and they are sincerely
implementing their obligations. The NPDI judges the progress in nuclear
disarmament as not good enough, although there has been certain progress. On the
other hand, the NAC and the NAM strongly criticize the nuclear-weapon states by
stating that they have either not implemented their nuclear disarmament
12) 2015 NPT Review Conference, General Debate, Statement by Iran on behalf of the NAM
(Group of Non-aligned Movement), 27 April 2015.
13) 2015 NPT Review Conference, Subsidiary Body I: Draft Substantive Elements, NPT/
CONF.2015/SB.I/CRP.1, 8 May 2015.
14) 2015 NPT Review Conference, Main Committee I: Revised Draft Chairman’s Report, NPT/
CONF.2015/MC.I/CRP.4/Rev.1, 15 May 2015.
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obligations at all or not implemented them enough.
The evaluations are so varied mainly because the groups all evaluate the
obligations subjectively from their own points of view. In addition, the evaluation
is difficult because the action plans adopted at the 2010 Conference are the
outcome of compromise and the content of the obligations is not necessarily
expressed precisely and concretely. In particular, many obligations do not include
timelines or benchmarks for implementing obligations clearly. As a result, various
different interpretations of obligations are possible. Thus, I will try to evaluate the
progress in nuclear disarmament obligations in the last five years on the basis of
the final document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference15).
Implementation of the 2010 Action Plans
The final document of 2010 NPT Review Conference contains 22 action plans
on nuclear disarmament. In A. Principles and Objectives, all states parties commit
to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the treaty and the objective of
achieving a world without nuclear weapons under Action 1 and to apply the
principles of irreversibility, verifiability, and transparency under Action 2.
Activities by the nuclear-weapon states are not generally conceived to be
compatible with Action 1 because all are reportedly modernizing their nuclear
arsenals. Three principles under Action 2 seem to be implemented partially, but
this is not good enough.
In B. Disarmament of Nuclear Weapons, the nuclear reduction in accordance
with the New START Treaty under Action 4 has been implemented by the U.S.
and Russia, but discussions on follow-on measures have not been continued.
Requirements for nuclear reduction under Actions 3, 5(a), and 5(b) have not been
fully implemented. Requests to diminish the role of nuclear weapons under Action
5(c), discuss policies for preventing the use of nuclear weapons under Action 5(d),
reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems under Action 5(e), and
reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons under Action 5(f) have
15) See Gareth Evans, Tanya Ogilive-White, Ramesh Thakur, Nuclear Weapons: The State of
Play 2015 (Australian National University, 2015); Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, Implementation
of the Conclusions and Recommendations for Follow-on Actions (James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, April 2015); Reaching Critical Will, The NPT Action Plan
Monitoring Report (March 2015); Hiroshima Prefecture, Hiroshima Report 2015: Evaluation
of Achievement in Nuclear Disarmament, Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security in 2014
(March 2015); Hiroshima Prefecture, Hiroshima Report 2014:Evaluation of Achievement in
Nuclear Disarmament, Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security in 2013 (March 2014).
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generally not been implemented, although some measures have been taken mainly
by the U.S. Establishment of a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament
under Action 6 has not been realized.
In C. Security Assurances, the agreement to immediately begin discussion of
negative security assurances under Action 7 has not been implemented. In
connection with the signature and ratification of the protocols to NWFZ treaties
under Action 9, all five nuclear-weapons states have signed the protocol to the
Central Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty, and all except the U.S. have
ratified it.
In D. Nuclear Testing, the undertaking by all nuclear-weapon states to ratify
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty with all expediency under Action 10
has not been realized because neither the U.S. nor China has ratified it.
In E. Fissile Material, the reaffirmation by the conference of the urgent
necessity of negotiation and bringing to a conclusion a Fissile Material Cut-off
Treaty has not been implemented as no negotiations have been conducted.
These explanations make clear that, by the time of the 2015 NPT Review
Conference, no subsidiary body had been immediately established to deal with
nuclear disarmament at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) under Action 6, no
discussions had immediately begun for effective international arrangements for
negative security assurances at the CD under Action 7, the CTBT had not been
ratified by all nuclear-weapon states with all expediency under Action 10, and the
agreement by all states to immediately begin negotiations of a FMCT at the CD
under Action 15 had not been put into action. The level of the implementation of
the several measures for concrete nuclear disarmament introduced under Action 5
has been very low, although some measures have been partially implemented by
some states.
As a result, the 2010 Action Plans included in the Final Document generally
have not been implemented, except the entry into force and implementation of the
New START Treaty by the U.S. and Russia, and the signature and ratification of
the protocol to the Central Asia NWFZ Treaty.
2 Humanitarian Approach to Nuclear Disarmament
One of the main issues for discussion at the Review Conference in 2015 was
on the humanitarian approach to nuclear disarmament based on the development of
positive and constructive arguments for the humanitarian approach in the last five
years. The joint statement read by Austria was supported by 159 states, and the
Austrian Pledge (Humanitarian Pledge) was also supported by 107 states, showing
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that the great majority supported this idea. At the same time, the joint statement
read by Australia on behalf of 26 states emphasized not only the humanitarian
dimension but also the security dimension. The P5 nuclear-weapon states were
rather negative towards the humanitarian approach and preferred to emphasize the
security aspect for nuclear disarmament.
159 States Joint Statement by Austria
The central message from the joint statement on humanitarian consequences of
nuclear weapons16) read by Austria is as follows:
Our countries are deeply concerned about the catastrophic humanitarian
consequences of nuclear weapons. We firmly believe that awareness of the
catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons must underpin all approaches
and efforts towards nuclear disarmament.
It is in the interest of the very survival of humanity that nuclear weapons are
never used again under any circumstances. The catastrophic effects of a nuclear
weapon detonation, whether by accident, miscalculation or design, cannot be
adequately addressed.
All efforts must be exerted to eliminate the threat of these weapons of mass
destruction. The only way to guarantee that nuclear weapons will never be
used again is through their total elimination.
The working paper on humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons17) submitted by
Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, Egypt, the Holy See, Indonesia, Ireland, Malaysia,
Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, the Philippines, South Africa, Sweden, and
Switzerland recommended actions such as to emphasize that the consequences of a
nuclear weapon detonation and the risks associated with this weaponry concern the
security of all humanity; to affirm that it is in the interest of the very survival of
humanity that nuclear weapons are never used again, under any circumstances; to
be cognizant of the fact that the risk of nuclear weapons’ use can only be avoided
through the total elimination of nuclear weapons; to emphasize that the scope of
consequences of nuclear weapon detonation raises profound moral and ethical
questions; and to stress that there is an urgent need for full implementation of
existing obligations to identify and pursue effective measures to achieve a world
16) 2015 NPT Review Conference, General Debate, Statement by Austria, Joint Statement on the
Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons, 28 April 2015.
17) 2015 NPT Review Conference, Working Paper by Austria and 14 other states, Humanitarian
Impact of Nuclear Weapons, NPT/CONF.2015, WP.30, 22 April 2015.
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without nuclear weapons.
The NAM states that “We remain extremely concerned at their possible use or
threat of use and are convinced that their total elimination is the only absolute
guarantee against such use or threat of use. We firmly believe that any use or
threat of use of nuclear weapons would be a crime against humanity and a
violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international
law, in particular international humanitarian law.18)”
The NAC states that “The international community’s understanding of the
catastrophic humanitarian consequences of a nuclear weapon detonation has
increased exponentially since the last NPT Review Conference in 2010 with a
number of key findings emerging from the evidence presented at three conferences
in Norway, Mexico and Austria. The complete elimination of nuclear weapons is
the only way to avoid a nuclear weapon detonation and the catastrophic
humanitarian consequences that would follow.19)”
The essential logic of these statements is that (i) the awareness of the
catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons must underpin all approaches and
efforts toward nuclear disarmament, (ii) it is the interest of the very survival of
humanity that nuclear weapons are never used again, and (iii) all efforts must be
exerted to eliminate nuclear weapons.
The similar and important message is also included in the Austrian Pledge20)
(Humanitarian Pledge), which was read by the Austrian Minister for Foreign
Affairs, at the end of the Third International Conference on the Impact of Nuclear
Weapons in December 2014 in Vienna emphasizing the following points:
2 Austria pledges to follow the imperative of human security for all and to
promote the protection of civilians against risks stemming from nuclear
weapons.
3 Austria calls upon all states parties to the NPT to identify and pursue
effective measures to fill the legal gap for the prohibition and elimination of
nuclear weapons;
18) 2015 NPT Review Conference, General Debate, Statement by Iran on behalf of the NAM,
27 April 2015.
19) 2015 NPT Review Conference, General Debate, Statement by New Zealand on behalf of the
NAC, 27 April 2015.
20) 2015 NPT Review Conference, Working Paper by Austria, The Vienna Conference on the
Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons and the Austrian Pledge, NPT/CONF.2015/WP.29,
21 April 2015.
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5 Austria pledges to cooperate with all relevant stakeholders in efforts to
stigmatize, prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons in the light of their
unacceptable humanitarian consequences and associated risks.
26 States Joint Statement by Australia
The Joint Statement on the Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons21)
read by Australia on behalf of Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia,
Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Turkey includes the following sentences
as the central message.
The renewed global focus on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons has
reenergised concerns about the horrific consequences for humanity that would
result from a nuclear weapons detonation or a terrorist attack involving fissile
material. We stress the significance of spreading awareness of the humanitarian
impact of nuclear weapons across borders and generations.
It is crucial that all states more resolutely and urgently fulfill their disarmament
commitments and work to ensure these weapons are not used and do not
proliferate. At the same time, eliminating nuclear weapons is only possible
through substantive and constructive engagement with those states which
possess nuclear weapons. To create the conditions that would facilitate further
major reduction in nuclear arsenals and eventually eliminate them requires the
global community to cooperate to address the important security and
humanitarian dimensions of nuclear weapons.
We need to work methodically and with realism if we are going to attain the
necessary confidence and transparency to bring about nuclear disarmament.
There are no short cuts.
Like the Austrian joint statement, this statement also stresses the concerns
about the horrific consequences for humanity and emphasizing that these must be
a base for our efforts to ensure nuclear weapons are never used. However, it
stresses that to create the conditions for nuclear reduction and elimination, the
global community must cooperate to address the important security and
humanitarian dimensions of nuclear weapons, and that we need to work
methodically and with realism if we are going to attain the necessary confidence
21) 2015 NPT Review Conference, General Debate, Statement by Australia, Joint Statement on
the Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons, 30 April 2015.
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and transparency to bring about nuclear disarmament. The statement does not deny
the humanitarian approach, but it emphasizes the importance of the security
dimension for nuclear disarmament to proceed.
The Nuclear-Weapon States
The U.S. stated that “The Conference could acknowledge the international
interest in the catastrophic consequences that could accompany the use of nuclear
weapons, and emphasize that this concern underpins efforts and commitments
towards nuclear disarmament and prevention of the proliferation of nuclear
weapons to additional states or non-state actors. It could affirm that it is in the
interest of all nations that the nearly 70-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons
be extended forever.22)”
The UK stated that “it attended the Vienna Conference because we recognize
the importance that many attach to this initiative. Our deterrence doctrines were
developed in the full knowledge of those potential consequences. Some would like
to force the speed of disarmament without taking into account wider security
considerations. This risks jeopardizing the achievements of the NPT and
undermining its future.23)”
France stated that “France is fully aware of the severe effects of nuclear
weapons. Nuclear weapons cannot be used as battlefield weapons. French nuclear
deterrence is purely defensive and strictly limited to defending its vital interests
under extreme circumstances of self-defence. It is fully compliance with
international law.24)”
The P5 Nuclear-Weapon States stated that “We are ever cognizant of the severe
consequences that would accompany the use of nuclear weapons. We affirm our
resolve to prevent such an occurrence from happening. We each give the highest
priority to ensuring the safety, security, and effective control over nuclear
weapons. We further affirm that we do not target any state with nuclear
weapons.25)”
22) 2015 NPT Review Conference, General Debate, Statement by the United States, 27 April
2015.
23) 2015 NPT Review Conference, General Debate, Statement by the United Kingdom, 27 April
2015.
24) 2015 NPT Review Conference, General Debate, Statement by France, 27 April 2015.
25) 2015 NPT Review Conference, General Debate, Statement by the Five Nuclear-Weapon
States, 30 April 2015.
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Generally, the nuclear-weapon states are negative to support the humanitarian
approach. However, the U.S. supports the approach and recommends extending the
70-year record of the non-use of nuclear weapons. The U.K. with the U.S.
attended the Third International Conference. Russia and France were very negative
towards this approach at the Review Conference.
The nuclear-weapon states as a whole recognize the severe consequences of the
use of nuclear weapons and give the highest priority to ensuring the safety,
security, and effective control of nuclear weapons. They are ready to prevent any
accidental use of nuclear weapons, but intentional use is not mentioned because
their security doctrines are underpinned by the possible use of nuclear weapons
under the theory of nuclear deterrence.
Draft Final Document
As evidence of wide and deep discussions of the humanitarian approach, the
Draft Final Document by the President includes the following paragraphs in the
review. The Conference reiterates its deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian
consequences (para.135), acknowledges the need to make every efforts to avert the
danger of a nuclear war (para.136), notes the conferences held in Oslo, Nayarit,
and Vienna (para.137), notes various joint statements on humanitarian dimension
(para.138), notes the Pledge presented at the Vienna Conference (para.139), and
notes that no states or international organizations could adequately address the
humanitarian emergency (para.140).
The operative paragraph 1 of the Draft Final Document provides for the
following:
1 The Conference emphasizes that deep concerns pertaining to the catastrophic
humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons are a key factor that
should continue to underpin efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament and that
awareness of these consequence should lend urgency to efforts by all states
leading to a world without nuclear weapons. The Conference affirms that,
pending the realization of this objective, it is in the interest of humanity and
the security of all peoples that nuclear weapons never be used again.
This is the first paragraph of the action plans on nuclear disarmament in the
Draft Final Document, and it emphasizes the catastrophic humanitarian
consequences of any use of nuclear weapons to underpin efforts for nuclear
disarmament and awareness of these consequences as a key for moving toward a
world without nuclear weapons.
Strongly argued for is the phrase “it is in the interest of humanity and the
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security of all peoples that nuclear weapons never be used again.” The previous
version stipulated that “it is in the interest of the very survival of humanity that
nuclear weapons never be used again.” “The interest of the very survival of
humanity” was changed to “the interest of humanity and security of all peoples.”
The word “security” was inserted because the nuclear-weapon states and the 26-
state joint statement argued for the importance of security as well as humanitarian
interests in nuclear disarmament. Therefore, the draft final document provides for
“the security of all peoples”.
3 Legal Framework for a World Without Nuclear Weapons
NAC Proposal
The 2010 NPT Review Conference affirms that “all states need to make special
efforts to establish the necessary framework to achieve and maintain a world
without nuclear weapons” and notes the five-point proposal for nuclear
disarmament of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, which proposes
consideration of negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention or agreement on a
framework of mutually reinforcing instruments.
The NAC urges all states parties to seize the opportunity of this Review
Conference to begin work in earnest on the construction of a comprehensive,
legally binding mechanism for the achievement and maintenance of a world
without nuclear weapons, whether that is pursued through the negotiation of a
stand-alone agreement or a framework of mutually supportive instruments. This
should include clearly defined benchmarks and timelines and be backed by a
strong system of verification26).
The NAC submitted a working paper on Article VI of the NPT27) elaborating
the legal framework for nuclear elimination, the main parts of which are as
follows:
1 The final document of 2010 Review Conference affirmed that “all states need
to make special efforts to establish the necessary framework to achieve and
26) 2015 NPT Review Conference, General Debate, Statement by New Zealand on behalf of the
NAC, 27 April 2015.
27) 2015 NPT Review Conference, Working Paper by the NAC, Article VI of the NPT, NPT/
CONF.2015/WP.9, 9 March 2015. The NAC had submitted a working paper with the same
title in 2014 that examined in more detail the options for a legal framework for the
achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons. 2014 NPT Preparatory
Commission, Working Paper by the NAC, Article VI of the NPT, NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/
WP.18, 2 April 2014.
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maintain a world without nuclear weapons”.
2 The NAC believes that it is high time to elaborate the “effective measures”
relating to nuclear disarmament.
3 This paper seeks to elucidate the legal approaches capable of advancing
“effective measures.”
8 In the light of this analysis, it is apparent that states parties are presented
with a choice between two legally distinct approaches.
9 The first approach involves the negotiation of a) stand-alone agreement,
whether a comprehensive convention or a ban treaty. The difference between
the two agreements lies not in their architecture – they are indeed points on the
same legal spectrum – but in their location along that spectrum in terms of
scope and level of detail. The broader and more detailed comprehensive
convention is at one end of the spectrum and the ban treaty is towards the
other.
10 The second approach, that of a framework agreement comprising mutually
supporting instruments, is architecturally distinct from the comprehensive
convention/ban treaty approach in that it does not aim to create a set of
obligations in a single stand-alone agreement. Instead, it establishes obligations
pursuant to a “head”, or primary, agreement that would be negotiated first and
that would formulate the objectives of the overall regime, establishes broad
commitments of the states parties, and institutes a general system of
governance for subsequent negotiations. These subsequent “second tier”
negotiations would then articulate more detailed rules on discrete aspects of the
overall regime (often through a set of individual protocols). States parties will
need to decide, in the course of the negotiation, how broadly to define the
scope of the head agreement and the second-tier protocols, and also what
process to establish for negotiating these protocols.
11 The NAC believes that work to advance article VI’s “effective measures”
should now focus on enabling a choice between two legal approaches: the
stand-alone comprehensive convention/ban treaty or the framework agreement
of mutually supporting instruments.
In addition, the Austrian Pledge28) strongly argues for “to take effective
measures to fill the legal gap” as follows:
28) 2015 NPT Review Conference, Working Paper by Austria, The Vienna Conference on the
Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons and the Austrian Pledge, NPT/CONF.2015/WP.29,
21 April 2015.
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3 Austria calls upon all states parties to the NPT to renew their commitment to
the urgent and full implementation of existing obligations under article VI, and
to this end, to identify and pursue effective measures to fill the legal gap for
the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons, and Austria pledges to
cooperate with all stakeholders to achieve this goal.
Nuclear Weapons Convention
A comprehensive nuclear weapons convention has been called for by the NAM
states for a long time. The NAM stated at the Conference that “We reaffirm our
proposal for the urgent commencement of negotiating and bringing to a successful
conclusion, in the Conference on Disarmament, a comprehensive nuclear weapons
convention, which includes a phased program and a specified time frame for the
complete elimination of nuclear weapons.29)”
The NAM submitted one working paper30) stating “The Group of Non-
Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms the urgent necessity of negotiating
and bringing to a conclusion a phased program for the complete elimination of
nuclear weapons with a specified time frame. It reiterates its call to the Conference
on Disarmament to immediately establish, as the highest priority, a subsidiary
body to negotiate and conclude a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons
to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing,
stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction.”
The NAM submitted another working paper31) titled “Drafts Elements for a
Plan of Action for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons” that lists actions taken
through three phases: first phase: 2015-2020, second phase: 2020-2025, and third
phase: 2025-2030.
Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty
The idea of a nuclear weapons ban treaty is new in the NPT review process
and emerged from international NGOs during a last few years. The characteristics
of the idea rest on the following two points. One of the most significant
29) 2015 NPT Review Conference, General Debate, Statement by Iran on behalf of NAM
(Group of Non-aligned Movement), 27 April 2015.
30) 2015 NPT Review Conference, Working Paper by the NAM, Nuclear Disarmament, NPT/
CONF.2015/WP.13, 10 March 2015.
31) 2015 NPT Review Conference, Working Paper by the NAM, Draft Elements for a Plan of
Action for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, NPT/CONF.2015/WP.14, 13 March 2015.
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developments of this idea comes from the frustration of non-nuclear-weapon states
at the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament in general. They say that
“negotiations on a treaty banning nuclear weapons should be undertaken by
committed nations even without the participation of those armed with nuclear
weapons.32)” The key difference is that negotiation of the nuclear weapons
convention as currently conceived places the onus on the nuclear-armed states to
lead the process, in which they have indicated no interest33).
The second characteristic of this idea concerns with the obligations under the
treaty. Banning nuclear weapons would likely entail the development of an
international legal instrument prohibiting the use, development, production
stockpiling, transfer, acquisition, deployment, and financing of nuclear weapons, as
well as prohibiting assistance of these acts. In short, this treaty would prohibit the
use and possession of nuclear weapons. The International Campaign to Abolish
Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) says that a nuclear weapons ban would globalize what
nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties have done regionally and that the ban treaty
itself need not necessarily envisage every complex step towards eliminations by all
nations.
As the background of this new idea, two recent international trends can be
identified. One is the successful conclusion of the Anti-Personnel Landmine Treaty
and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The negotiations of these treaties were
initiated by Middle Powers without the participation of militarily strong and
important states, and they succeeded in concluding the treaties through the Ottawa
Process and Oslo Process, respectively. The other is a humanitarian approach to
nuclear disarmament, which has been strongly argued for in recent discussions on
nuclear disarmament. The Anti-Personnel Landmine Treaty and the Convention on
Cluster Munitions were mainly negotiated on the basis of not a traditional arms
control approach or the consideration of strategic stability but the negative
humanitarian effects of these weapons, in particular against women and children.
However, the idea that negotiations should be started without the nuclear-
weapon states is opposed by not only the nuclear-weapon states but also some non
-nuclear-weapon states. For example, Russia states that “It is important to be
aware that we have come very close to the stage when the advancement towards
‘nuclear zero’ is only possible through the involvement of all nuclear-weapon-
32) ICAN, Ban Nuclear Weapons Now, July 2013, p.2.
33) Ray Acheson, Thomas Nash, and Richard Moyes, A Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons,
Article 36 and Reaching Critical Will, May 2014, p.4.
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capable states without exception.34)” The joint statement35) submitted by Australia
on behalf of 26 states argues that “eliminating nuclear weapons is only possible
through substantive and constructive engagement with those states which possess
nuclear weapons.” In addition, Angela Kane, High Representative for Disarmament
Affairs of the United Nations, is critical of the idea of negotiations without nuclear
-weapon states36).
Framework Agreement
In the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference37), the Conference
notes the five-point proposal for nuclear disarmament of the Secretary-General of
the United Nations, which proposes consideration of negotiations on a nuclear
weapons convention or agreement on a framework of separate mutually reinforcing
instruments.
The NAC proposal is to establish obligations pursuant to a “head”, or primary,
agreement that would be negotiated first and that would formulate the objectives
of the overall regime, establish broad commitments of the states parties, and
institute a general system of governance for subsequent negotiations. These
subsequent “second tier” negotiations would then articulate more detailed rules on
discrete aspects of the overall regime (often through a set of individual
protocols)38).
As examples, the United Nations Convention on Climate Change was
concluded in 1994 as a framework treaty and the Kyoto Protocol was signed in
1997 for precise and concrete obligations. The Vienna Convention for the
Protection of the Ozone Layer was signed in 1985 as a framework treaty and the
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Delete the Ozone Layer was signed in 1989.
In addition, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons was signed in 1980
as a framework treaty, and five protocols for special and concrete obligations have
34) 2015 NPT Review Conference, General Debate, Statement by the Russian Federation, 27
April 2015.
35) 2015 NPT Review Conference, General Debate, Statement by Australia, Joint Statement on
the Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons, 30 April 2015.
36)Angela Kane, The New Zealand Lecture on Disarmament, UNODA Occasional Papers,
No.26, June 2014, p.47.
37) 2010 NPT Review Conference, Final Document, Volume I, NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol.1), 18
June 2010.
38) 2015 NPT Review Conference, Working Paper by the NAC, Article VI of the NPT, NPT/
CONF.2015/WP.9, 9 March 2015.
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been signed so far.
In the case of nuclear abolition, the idea that “an unequivocal undertaking by
the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear
arsenals” agreed in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference39) is
worth a deep examination. This is a political obligation that can possibly be
changed into a legal obligation under a framework treaty for nuclear abolition.
Step by Step Approach
Those states opposed to a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons assert the step by
step approach. In particular, the nuclear-weapon states all strongly support the step
by step approach.
The U.S. stated that “The United States will continue to work step-by-step
toward fulfilling our obligations under Article VI and our commitment under the
2010 Action Plan across all three NPT pillars.40)” and “we remain committed that
the practical step-by-step path we are following remains the only realistic route to
a world without nuclear weapons. I would underline that ‘step-by-step’ does not
mean one step at a time. It means we pursue all available avenues, with steps
building on and creating opportunities for others, all in the context of enhancing
international stability, peace, and security.41)”
The U.K. stated that “The United Kingdom remains firmly committed to step-
by-step disarmament. But let me be clear: the UK is here to negotiate in good
faith, and will continue to strive to build the conditions for a world without
nuclear weapons.42)” France also stated that “The ultimate objective of elimination
cannot be declared abstractly, without taking into account the international
strategic context. It can only be reached through a series of concrete measures,
step by step.43)”
The five nuclear-weapon states as a group stated that “As NPT nuclear-weapon
states, we reaffirm the shared goal of nuclear disarmament and general and
complete disarmament. We continue to pursue progressive and concrete steps
39) 2000 NPT Review Conference, Final Document, Part I, NPT/CONF.2000/28(Part I),
20 May 2000.
40) 2015 NPT Review Conference, Working Paper by the U.S., Implementing the NPT:
Disarmament, NPT/CONF.2015, WP.44, 29 April 2015
41) 2015 NPT Review Conference, Subsidiary Body I, Statement by the U.S., May 5, 2015.
42) 2015 NPT Review Conference, General Debate, Statement by the United Kingdom, 27 April
2015.
43) 2015 NPT Review Conference, General Debate, Statement by France, 27 April 2015.
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towards this end in a way that promotes international stability, peace and security,
and based on the principle of increased and undiminished security for all. We
continue to believe that an incremental, step-by-step approach is the only practical
option for making progress towards nuclear disarmament.44)”
Japan stated that “There are no shortcuts to nuclear disarmament and non-
proliferation. Cooperation between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon
states in advancing practical and concrete measures, which are outlined in the
NPDI proposal, is the way forward.45)” The NPDI stated that “We call for greater
progress in meeting disarmament commitments. This includes enhanced
transparency, a diminished role for nuclear weapons in military and security
doctrines, deeper reductions in all types of nuclear weapons and multilateral
negotiations for the reduction of nuclear weapons. We call on all states that have
not done so, to sign and ratify the CTBT. We also welcome the work of the Fissile
Material Cut-Off Treaty Group of Governmental Experts.46)” They also support the
step by step approach, which is now understood to be the same as the building
blocks approach.
The building blocks approach was proposed by 20 non-nuclear-weapon states
at the Third Preparatory Committee of the 2015 NPT Review Conference in April
201447). It stated that “A focus on ‘building blocks’ can complement the pursuit of
a ‘step by step’ approach. It foresees the possibility of parallel and simultaneous
steps. While ultimate measures for achieving and maintaining a world without
nuclear weapons will need to be multilateral, effective disarmament will require
mutually reinforcing ‘building blocks’ that are multilateral, pluralistic, bilateral or
unilateral. There are already in place a number of multilateral ‘building blocks’ in
support of achieving and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons. More
‘building blocks’ are required. In due course toward a world without nuclear
weapons, it will be necessary to give further thought, with a longer perspective, to
how a multilateral nuclear disarmament framework or nuclear weapons convention
44) 2015 NPT Review Conference, General Debate, Statement by the Five Nuclear-Weapon
States, 30 April 2015
45) 2015 NPT review Conference, General Debate, Statement by Japan, 27 April 2015.
46) 2015 NPT Review Conference, General Debate, Statement by The Netherlands on behalf of
the NPDI (Non-proliferation and Disarmament Initiative), 27 April 2015.
47) 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee, Working Paper by Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, The
Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and Ukraine, Building Blocks for a World
without Nuclear Weapons, NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.23, 15 April 2014.
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would look like as the final ‘building block’.”
Draft Final Document
The arguments on a legal framework for nuclear disarmament are mainly
contained in paragraph 19, but paragraphs 2 and 3 also deal with this issue and
how to make efforts for nuclear disarmament. Paragraph 2 stipulates that “The
Conference calls for the pursuit of all effective measures for the full
implementation of article VI.” The first draft for this was very precise, providing
for “Pending the establishment of the necessary legal framework to achieve and
maintain a world without nuclear weapons, the Conference endorsed the
accelerated pursuit of various practical building blocks for a world without nuclear
weapons that can be realized simultaneously, including through multilateral,
plurilateral, bilateral and unilateral measures.”
Paragraph 3 was included only in the final version that stipulates that “The
Conference reaffirms the urgent need for the nuclear-weapon states to implement
the steps leading to nuclear disarmament agreed to in the Final Documents of the
2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, in a way that promotes international stability,
peace and security, and based on the principle of undiminished and increased
security for all.”
Paragraph 19 of the Draft Final Document provide for the following:
19 The Conference recommends that the United Nations General Assembly
establish at its seventieth session an open-ended working group to identify and
elaborate effective measurers for the full implementation of article VI,
including legal provisions or other arrangements that contribute to and are
required for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear
weapons. The legal provisions could be established through various
approaches, including a stand-alone instrument or a framework agreement.
Without prejudice to the prerogative of the United Nations General Assembly
to determine the methods of work of its subsidiary bodies in accordance with
its rule of procedure, the Conference recommends that the open-ended working
group conduct its work on the basis of consensus. The Conference encourages
all states to engage in this open and inclusive process.
The reference to the legal provisions is only “a stand-alone instrument or a
framework agreement,” which is much less precise than the explanation in the
previous four versions, which stated that “a stand-alone instrument, which could
take the form of a nuclear-weapons-ban treaty or a comprehensive nuclear
weapons convention, as referred to in resolution A/RES/68/32, that would include
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a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a
specified timeframe; a framework agreement comprising mutually supporting
instruments that would establish the key prohibition, obligations and arrangement
for time-bound, irreversible and verifiable nuclear disarmament; or other
arrangements.” This means that the legal framework is greatly de-emphasized in
the final version, because of the opposition or resistance from the nuclear-weapon
states.
The recommendation for the establishment of an open-ended working group at
the UN General Assembly will be discussed at its coming session. The issue of a
legal framework causes a lot of division between those states that ask for a treaty
and those that support the step by step approach.
III Concrete Measures for Nuclear Disarmament
1 Reduction of Nuclear Weapons
Reducing the number of nuclear weapons is the central measure for nuclear
disarmament. Although the 2010 Final Document stipulated that “the nuclear
weapon states commit to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately
eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including
through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures,” and “Russia and
the U.S. commit to seek the early entry into force of the New START Treaty,”
only the bilateral reduction by the U.S. and Russia has in fact been realized.
Many non-nuclear-weapon states including the NPDI48), the Nordic
Countries49) and the NAM50) strongly called for measures for reducing nuclear
weapons at the Conference, including not only further reduction by the U.S. and
Russia but also reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons and the participation of
other nuclear-weapon states in negotiations.
Paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of the Draft Final Document provide for the following:
4 The Conference calls upon all nuclear-weapon states, in implementing their
unequivocal undertaking, to reduce further and eliminate, in a transparent,
irreversible and verifiable manner, all types of nuclear weapons, strategic and
48) 2015 NPT Review Conference, Working Paper by the PPDI, Recommendations for
Consideration, NPT/CONF.2015/WP.16, 20 March 2015.
49) 2015 NPT Review Conference, Working Paper by the Nordic Countries, NPT/CONF.2015/
WP.15, 13 March 2015.
50) 2015 NPT Review Conference, Working Paper by the NAM, Nuclear Disarmament, NPT/
CONF.2015/WP.13, 10 March 2015.
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non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed, regardless of location, including
through negotiations as well as unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral
measures.
5 The Conference encourages the Russian Federation and the United States of
America to commence negotiations at an early date to achieve greater
reductions in their stockpiles of nuclear weapons with a view to concluding
such negotiations as soon as possible. The Conference acknowledges the
importance of the Russian Federation and the United States of America
addressing all issues related to strategic stability in the nuclear disarmament
process.
6 The Conference encourages the nuclear-weapon states to engage over the
course of the next review cycle, with a view to achieving rapid reduction in the
global stockpile of nuclear weapons.
Paragraph 4 is almost the same as that in the 2010 final document. The early
versions of the first part of paragraph 5, which encourages the two nuclear
superpowers to achieve further reduction, included such phrases as “including non-
strategic nuclear weapons,” and “concluding negotiations prior to the expiration of
the New START Treaty,” but they were deleted. The phrase in its second part
“addressing issues pertaining to other types of related strategic offensive and
defensive weapon systems with a view to facilitating and accelerating the nuclear
disarmament process” was changed to “addressing all issues related to strategic
stability in the nuclear disarmament process.”
It is important to mention here that the original paragraph included in the first
to fourth versions stating that “the Conference calls upon the nuclear-weapon
states to cease the development of new nuclear weapons and qualitative
improvement of existing nuclear weapons systems that are designed to support
military missions or provide for new military capability” was completely omitted
from the final version.
At the final stage, Paragraph 12 was inserted in which the Conference urges
the Conference on Disarmament to establish a subsidiary body to deal with
nuclear disarmament using exactly the same phrasing as the 2010 Final Document.
The analysis of the part of nuclear reduction leads us to conclude that, during
the debate at the Conference, new ideas and approaches were suggested, but the
outcome is almost the same as the content in the 2010 Final Document.
2 Reduction of the Role of Nuclear Weapons
Reducing the role of nuclear weapons is one of the key elements in U.S.
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President Barack Obama’s historical address in Prague in April 2009. The 2010
Final Document called upon the nuclear-weapon states “to further reduce the role
and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines
and policies.”
The first version included encouragement to nuclear-weapon states to undertake
not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, but it was soon deleted from the second
version. The NAC demands that “the Conference should encourage all states
parties that are part of regional alliances that include nuclear-weapon states to
reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their collective security doctrines.51)”
Paragraph 7 of the Draft Final Document provides for the following:
7 The Conference calls upon all states concerned to continue to review their
military and security concepts, doctrines and policies over the course of the
next review cycle with a view to reducing the role and significance of nuclear
weapons therein.
The content on the reduction of the role of nuclear weapons seems to be
almost the same as that in the 2010 Final Document. However, taking into account
the NAC proposal and the difference in the addressees between the two
documents, we can find new progress in this paragraph. The addressees in 2010
are “the nuclear-weapon states,” but ones in 2015 are “all states concerned,” which
means all states parties that are part of regional alliances that include a nuclear-
weapon state.
As a result, non-nuclear-weapon states under the nuclear umbrella of nuclear
weapon states, such as Japan, Australia, Republic of Korea, and the non-nuclear-
weapon NATO members, are called upon to continue to review their military
policies to reduce the role of nuclear weapons.
3 De-Alerting and Response to Nuclear Risk
The Final Document in 2010 called upon the nuclear-weapon states “to reduce
the operational status of nuclear weapons system” and “to reduce the risk of
accidental use of nuclear weapons.” These measures have long been called for as
measures to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons being used and their role and
importance.
During the discussions at the Conference, the De-alerting Group took an
initiative and urged the nuclear-weapon states to take all steps to rapidly and
51) 2015 NPT Review Conference, Working Paper by the NAC, Taking forward Nuclear
Disarmament, NPT/CONF.2015/WP.8, 9 March 2015.
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comprehensively address the great risks relating to high alert levels and take steps
to rapidly reduce operational readiness52).
Paragraph 8 of the Draft Final Document provides for the following:
8 The Conference urges nuclear-weapon states to continue undertaking all
efforts necessary to comprehensively address risks associated with unintended
nuclear detonations, including, but not limited to, protection of command and
control systems against potential cyber threats.
The earlier versions referred to “risks associated with nuclear weapons,” but
the final version referred only to “risks associated with unintended nuclear
detonations.” Also, “those stemming from threats posed by non-state actors” in the
earlier version was deleted from the final version. As a result, it seems that the
area with which to deal in connection with risks associated with nuclear weapons
was narrowed and mainly focused on the protection of command and control
systems against cyber threats.
Paragraph 9 of the Draft Final Document provides for the following:
9 The Conference encourages the consideration of further practical measures to
reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.
Although this paragraph from the first to fourth versions stated that “the
Conference emphasizes the need to reduce rapidly, as an interim measure, the
operational status of nuclear weapons systems, leading to a phased removal of all
nuclear weapons from high alert levels, with a view to increasing international
stability and security while lowering the humanitarian risks associated with nuclear
weapons,” the final version contained almost none of this fruitful and meaningful
content.
4 Negative Security Assurances and Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones
Paragraph 13 on negative security assurances, which was inserted in the fifth
version at the last point and repeated the content of the 2010 Final Document,
provides for the following:
13 Recalling action 7 agreed to at the 2010 Review Conference, the
Conference urges the Conference on Disarmament, within the context of an
agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, to immediately begin
discussion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon
states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, to discuss
52) 2015 NPT Review Conference, Working Paper by the De-alerting Group, NPT/CONF.2015/
WP.21, 9 April 2015.
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substantively, without limitation, with a view to elaborating recommendations
dealing with all aspects of this issue, not excluding an internationally legally
binding instrument.
Paragraph 14 on nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Draft Final Document
provides for the following:
14 The Conference encourages all states concerned to ratify the nuclear-
weapon-free zone treaties and their relevant protocols and to review any related
reservations and interpretative declarations over the course of the next review
cycle with a view to their withdrawal. The Conference encourages the parties
to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and the nuclear-
weapon states to continue to engage constructively in order to resolve
outstanding issues.
The part that encourages ratifying the treaties and protocols and reviewing
reservations with a view to their withdrawal is just the same as that in the 2010
Final Document. In the last five years, the Protocol to the Central Asia Nuclear
Weapon Free Zone Treaty was signed by all five nuclear-weapon states and
ratified by all except the U.S. However, there has been no progress in the
withdrawal of reservations and interpretative declarations. The part of the
Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone was added in the third version in order
to encourage engaging constructively to resolve outstanding issues for the
signature and ratification to its protocol.
At the Conference, the U.S. emphasized not only negative but also positive
security assurances taking into account Russia’s recent reemphasis on nuclear
weapons in its military and security policies. This means that Russia’s
commitment to negative security assurances has decreased.
5 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Paragraph 15 on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) provides
for the following:
15 In reaffirming actions 10 to 14 agreed to at the 2010 Review Conference,
the Conference calls upon the eight remaining states listed in Annex 2 of the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to take individual initiative to sign
and ratify that Treaty without further delay and without waiting for any other
state to do so. Pending the entry into force of that Treaty and against the
backdrop of, inter alia, widespread concern regarding the impact on health and
environmental consequences resulting from nuclear tests and, in particular, the
effects on children’s and women’s health, all states commit to cease and
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refrain from nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other explosions, the use of
new nuclear weapons technologies and from any action, including those at the
former nuclear test sites, that would defeat the object and purpose of that
Treaty, and to maintain moratoriums on nuclear test explosions. The
Conference recalls that the CTBT will provide an effective disarmament and
non-proliferation measure by constraining the development and qualitative
improvement of nuclear weapons.
The central content of this paragraph, which calls upon the eight remaining
states to sign and ratify the treaty and to commit to maintain moratoriums, is just
the same as that in the 2010 Final Document. However, unlike the 2010 document,
which states that “positive decisions by nuclear-weapon states would have the
beneficial impact towards the ratification of that Treaty” and “the nuclear-weapon
states have the special responsibility to encourage Annex 2 states to sign and
ratify,” the 2015 document calls upon the eight remaining states to “take individual
initiative to sign and ratify without waiting for any other states to do so.”
What is characteristic in the 2015 document is its reference to “against the
backdrop of widespread concern regarding the impact on health and environmental
consequences resulting from nuclear tests, in particular, the effects on children’s
and women’s health,” meaning all states are called upon to cease and refrain from
nuclear tests. This is clear evidence that the international community is clearly and
deeply concerned with the humanitarian impact of nuclear tests.
6 Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
Paragraph 16 on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) provides for the
following:
16 Recalling action 15 agreed to at the 2010 Review Conference, the
Conference urges the Conference on Disarmament, within the context of an
agreed, comprehensive and balanced grogramme of work, to immediately begin
negotiations of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the
report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (CD/1229) and the mandate
contained therein. These negotiations should take into account in particular all
substantive work undertaken during the past review cycle.
The main and central parts of this paragraph contain a recommendation almost
the same as one in the 2010 document. It urges the Conference on Disarmament to
immediately begin negotiations of a FMCT. The phrase “the Conference calls upon
nuclear-weapon states to maintain and implement moratoriums,” which was
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included in the first version, was deleted because of China’s usual strong
opposition. On the negotiating forum, the first version stipulated “preferably in the
Conference on Disarmament,” which was taken from the NPDI proposal53). That
suggests the possibility of the negotiations in another forum when the CD does not
work. The Nordic Countries clearly proposed that state should “note that the
United Nations disarmament machinery as a whole, including General Assembly,
subsidiary bodies and expert groups, should be used to pursue multilateral
disarmament, especially when the Conference on Disarmament remains stalled.54)”
As to the timeline, the first four versions included the phrase saying that the
Conference urges states to commence immediately “and to conclude rapidly
negotiations, before the end of the next review cycle.” However, the timeline
calling for concluding negotiations before the end of the next review cycle was
deleted from the final version.
7 Transparency and Regular Reporting
Paragraph 10 on enhancing transparency by the nuclear-weapon states provides
for the following:
10 The Conference encourages the nuclear-weapon states to build upon and
expand their efforts to enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence,
including by intensifying their discussion on definitions and terminology
related to nuclear weapons, with a view to facilitating and accelerating nuclear
disarmament.
This paragraph, which encourages the nuclear-weapon states to enhance
transparency and increase mutual confidence, was adopted with no change from
the first version. As an outcome of the discussion on definition and terminology
related to nuclear weapons, a book was submitted entitled “P5 Glossary of Key
Nuclear Terms”55) during the Conference.
Paragraph 11 on regular reporting provides for the following:
11 Welcoming the reports submitted by the nuclear-weapon states in a common
53) 2015 NPT Review Conference, Working Paper by the NPDI, Recommendations for
Consideration, NPT/CONF.2015/WP.16, 20 March 2015.
54) 2015 NPT Review Conference, Working Paper by the Nordic Countries, Recommendations
for Consideration, NPT/CONF.2015/WP.15, 13 March 2015.
55) P5 Working Group on the Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms, P5 Glossary of Key Nuclear
Terms, April 2015. <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/243287.pdf#search
=’glossary+of+nuclear+terms’>
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reporting framework, the Conference encourages further detailed reporting. The
Conference calls upon the nuclear-weapon states to provide regular reports on
their nuclear disarmament-related undertakings in accordance with actions 5
and 20 of the 2010 action plan and further calls upon the nuclear-weapon
states to continue their engagement on a standard reporting form and to report
to the 2017 and 2019 sessions of the Preparatory Committee, encouraging
them to take into account the following items, without prejudice to national
security: (i) the number, type (strategic or non-strategic) and status (deployed
or non-deployed) of nuclear warheads; (ii) the number and type of delivery
vehicles; (iii) the measures taken to diminish the role and significance of
nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies; (iv)
the measures taken to reduce the risk of unintended, unauthorized, or
accidental use of nuclear weapons: (v) the measures taken to de-alert or reduce
the operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems; (vi) the number and type
of weapons and delivery systems dismantled and reduced as part of nuclear
disarmament efforts; (vii) the amount of fissile material for military purposes.
The Conference agrees that the 2020 Review Conference and the 2017 and
2019 sessions of the Preparatory Committee should allocate specific time to
review the reports submitted by the nuclear-weapon states.
Towards the fulfillment of action 20 agreed to at the 2010 Review Conference,
the Conference calls upon states parties to increase the quality, quantity and
consistency of their reports as a contribution to enhanced transparency and to
report on their efforts to implement all aspects of paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995
decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament.”
The 2020 Review Conference will review the progress made in implementing
this reporting mechanism and consider next steps in this regard.
On this issue of transparency, the NPDI has taken the initiative and shown
leadership by submitting the Working Paper56) on transparency of nuclear weapons
at the first Preparatory Committee in 2012. On the basis of their belief that
increased transparency of information related to nuclear disarmament is an
important precondition for further progress in nuclear disarmament and
verification, they submitted a “Draft standard nuclear disarmament reporting form”
that describes very precise details of nuclear weapons related items to be reported.
56) 2015 NPT Review Conference, Working Paper by the NPDI, Transparency of Nuclear
Weapons, NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.12, 20 April 2012.
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At the Conference, the proposals by the NPDI and Japan were widely accepted
and reflected in the Draft Final Document. Seven categories of items that the
nuclear-weapon states are called upon to report were kept from the first to the fifth
and final versions of this paragraph. That means there is a wide and general
consensus on these seven categories.
In addition, the mechanism to scrutinize the information submitted by the
nuclear-weapon states is clearly stipulated. The nuclear-weapon states should
report to the 2017 and 2019 sessions of the Preparatory Committee, and the 2020
Review Conference and the 2017 and 2019 sessions of the Preparatory Committee
should allocate specific time to review the reports submitted by the nuclear-
weapon states.
Paragraph 17 on verification provides for the following:
17 The Conference encourages all states, including in cooperation with
international organizations and civil society, to pursue and intensify efforts to
develop nuclear disarmament verification capabilities, taking into account the
role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the area of verification, that
will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament
agreement for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear
weapons, including through the new and continuing initiatives pursued under
the leadership of Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, as well as the International Partnership for Nuclear
Disarmament Verification initiated by the United States of America.
This paragraph, which encourages all states to pursue and intensify efforts to
develop nuclear disarmament verification capabilities, is almost unchanged from
the first version.
8 Disarmament and Non-proliferation Education
During the Conference, Japan read a Joint Statement on Disarmament and Non
-proliferation Education57) on behalf of 73 states and emphasized that “it is
important to raise awareness both in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation
issues among the public, especially the young generation, of the catastrophic
humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, the threat of diverse
risks and challenges posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as
steps required to overcome these challenges.”
57) 2015 NPT Review Conference, Main Committee I, Joint Statement on Disarmament and
Non-proliferation Education by Japan on behalf of 73 states, 6 May 2015.
81OSAKA UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW No. 63 (February 2016)
The NPDI submitted a working paper that recommended that “the Conference
invite the world’s political leaders to visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki to witness the
humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons with their own eyes.”
Paragraph 18 on disarmament and non-proliferation education provides for the
following:
18 In light of the 70th year since the end of the tragic devastation of World
War II, the Conference encourages all states, including in cooperation with the
United Nations and other international organizations, the Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement, local government, non-governmental organizations,
academic institutions and the private sector, to continue and intensify efforts in
the field of disarmament and non-proliferation education to raise the awareness
of the public, in particular of younger and future generations, as well as of
leaders, disarmament experts and diplomats on all topics relating to nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation, including through interactions with and
directly sharing the experiences of the people and the communities affected by
nuclear weapons to know their humanitarian impact. The Conference also
encourages all states to make use of new information and communication
technology in these efforts.
The first version included the sentence “In view of the 70th anniversary of the
use of nuclear weapons, the Conference notes the proposal for world leaders,
disarmament experts and youth to visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki to witness first-
hand the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons
and to hear the testimonies of the survivors (Hibakusha).” However, the wording
met with a strong opposition from China and was then deleted from the second
version, and the new phrase “including through interactions with and directly
sharing the experiences of the people and the communities affected by nuclear
weapons to know their humanitarian impact” was agreed in the final version.
Although there is no direct reference to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the people and
the communities affected by nuclear weapons indirectly implies Hiroshima,
Nagasaki, and others.
9 General Evaluation
The content of the recommendations for nuclear disarmament in the Draft
Final Document generally seems to repeat the content of the 2010 Final Document
and includes no significant new undertakings. The reason is that, as I explained in
“Implementation of the 2010 Action Plans,” there has been almost no progress in
nuclear disarmament since 2010. As almost all promises agreed in 2010 had not
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been implemented, they needed to be repeated again in 2015.
The process of discussions at the Conference can be traced by examining each
version from the first to the fifth and final. Generally speaking, the draft text
included in the first to the fourth versions included many promising undertakings
towards further nuclear disarmament, but in the fifth and final version, these
measures were watered down by taking into account the opinions of the nuclear-
weapon states with a view to reaching a consensus among the states parties.
IV Challenges for a World Without Nuclear Weapons
1 U.S.-Russia Relations
The first issue that should be examined to analyze the Conference is the
relationship between the United States and Russia, because their sharp
confrontation is one of the most important reasons the Conference failed to adopt
a final document.
At the Conference, the U.S. stated that “Implementation of the New START
Treaty is going well and it remains on track, and it will reduce our current
stockpile of weapons significantly. But we know that we can cut back even
further, and President Obama has made clear our willingness, readiness, now, to
engage and negotiate further reductions of deployed strategic nuclear weapons by
up to one-third below the level set by New START. Let me underscore: that offer
remains on the table, and we urge the Russians to take us up on it.58)”
In its response, Russia stated that “In fact, it is the US policy that hinders
further nuclear reductions. That can be explained by its intransigent course, which
effectively undermines strategic stability in the world through unilateral build-up
of the global missile defense system, gradual advancement towards implementing
the ‘prompt global strike’ concept, attempt to stop in the tracks the negotiations on
banning the placement of weapons in outer space, and lack of progress in ratifying
the CTBT at the national level.59)”
This is quite contrary to the situation five years ago. Early in President Barack
Obama’s first term, the relationship between the U.S. and Russia was quite good.
They succeeded at resetting their relations, began negotiating a New START
Treaty, and signed the Treaty just before the Review Conference. In contrast, the
circumstances are much worse now mainly because of the Russia’s invasion of the
Crimea.
58) 2015 NPT Review Conference, General Debate, Statement by the U.S., 27 April 2015.
59) 2015 NPT Review Conference, General Debate, Statement by Russia, 27 April 2015.
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The first challenge is to restore and improve their relationship. This may be
very difficult in the short term, but they should both work hard for it. As the New
START Treaty is being implemented quite well in spite of their confrontation, they
should make efforts on the basis of this fact to make further progress in this field.
Also, as the Iranian nuclear issue is now moving towards a peaceful resolution,
they could exploit the situation to improve their relationship. Under these
circumstances, the U.S. may reconsider the missile defense systems program in
Europe, which the U.S. justified as protection against Iranian missiles.
In addition, what is lacking at this Conference in comparison with the previous
Conference is the lack of the leadership by the U.S. and the solidarity among the
five nuclear-weapon states. For nuclear disarmament to process, the solidarity
among the five is indispensable as they have to negotiate as a group with non-
nuclear-weapon states. For last few years, the five nuclear-weapon states have been
acting together on nuclear disarmament issues, such as making standard reporting
formula and publishing the P5 Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms. However, the five
need to cooperate more substantively on nuclear and security issues and make a
common stand towards nuclear disarmament by building stronger confidence
among them.
2 Forum for Nuclear Disarmament Negotiation
The second challenge concerns a forum for negotiating or discussing nuclear
disarmament issues. The three concrete nuclear disarmament measures agreed
upon in the 2010 Final Document but not implemented at all are related to the
Conference on Disarmament (CD). Under action 6, all states agree that the CD
should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament;
under action 7, all states agree that the CD should immediately begin discussions
of effective international arrangements for negative security assurances; and under
action 15, all states agree that the CD should immediately begin negotiations of a
fissile material cut-off treaty. All paragraphs asked that the CD should
“immediately” take actions, but no actions have been taken. These
recommendations had also been agreed in 1995 and 2000.
This is an extremely serious issue negatively influencing and blocking the
progress in nuclear disarmament. All states, in particular the nuclear-weapon
states, need to exert efforts to overcome this difficulty by taking concrete actions
more seriously and constructively.
The direct reason the CD does not work is generally believed to be that
Pakistan is blocking the adoption of a working program for the CD as it does not
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want to start negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Because it
works with the consensus rule, the CD cannot start any action. Even if the above
belief is true, almost no effort seems to have been made to break the deadlock.
Rather, as the nuclear-weapons states have no will to start negotiations or
discussions and seem to be exploiting Pakistan’s attitude to cover up this
unwillingness. The fact that China strongly opposed the moratorium on the
production of fissile material for weapon purposes at the 2010 and 2015 NPT
Review Conferences suggests that China is also opposed to beginning the
negotiations on a FMCT. All five nuclear-weapon states seem to be very negative
towards starting discussions on nuclear disarmament and negative security
assurances.
On the negotiating forum for a FMCT, the first version stipulates “preferably
in the Conference on Disarmament,” which is taken from the NPDI proposal60).
That suggests the possibility of holding the negotiations in another forum when
the CD does not work. The Nordic Countries also clearly proposed that states
should “note that the United Nations disarmament machinery as a whole, including
General Assembly, subsidiary bodies and expert groups, should be used to pursue
multilateral disarmament, especially when the Conference on Disarmament
remains stalled.61)” These proposals were not adopted in the Draft Final
Document, which clearly stipulated that negotiations should take place in the CD.
Thus, we cannot expect any progress in the negotiation of a FMCT.
The challenge is to overcome the stalemate of the CD, and when this is still
impossible, to examine other fora and start negotiations. First, the nuclear-weapon
states and other states should more actively persuade Pakistan to accept the start of
the negotiations. For example, the NPDI proposes that “the Conference agrees that
national and security concerns hindering the commencement of negotiations within
the CD on a FMCT can and should be effectively addressed in the course of
negotiations.”
Second, other fora should be examined to start negotiations on a FMCT, even
if Pakistan does not participate in the negotiation at the beginning, as the Nordic
Countries have proposed.
60) 2015 NPT Review Conference, Working Paper by the NPDI, Recommendations for
Consideration, NPT/CONF.2015/WP.16, 20 March 2015.
61) 2015 NPT Review Conference, Working Paper by the Nordic Countries, Recommendations
for Consideration, NPT/CONF.2015/WP.15, 13 March 2015.
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3 Humanitarian Concerns and Security
The idea of the humanitarian approach to nuclear disarmament has gained
general support in the last five years, and the Draft Final Document emphasizes
that deep concerns pertaining to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any
use of nuclear weapons are a key factor that should continue to underpin efforts in
the field of nuclear disarmament. This is a very favorable recent trend in the field
of nuclear disarmament. Traditionally, the disarmament issue has been treated only
from the viewpoints of security and strategic stability. Thus, to indicate the
importance of security and strategic stability in this field, the term “arms control”
rather than “disarmament” had been used more widely.
The issue here is the comparative importance of humanitarian concerns and
security. The first group represented by Austria on behalf of 159 states argues for
nuclear disarmament only from the humanitarian concerns because of the
catastrophic consequences of a nuclear detonation and calls for negotiation of a
nuclear weapons convention as the only way to eliminate the possibility of using
nuclear weapons. This idea is mainly supported by non-nuclear-weapon states not
under the nuclear umbrella of nuclear-weapon states.
The second group represented by Australia on behalf of 26 states agrees with
the first group on the catastrophic consequences of any use of nuclear weapons
and supports the humanitarian approach. However, they argue that not only the
humanitarian dimension but also security dimension must be taken into account for
nuclear disarmament to proceed. The states that support this idea mainly enjoy the
nuclear deterrence extended by nuclear-weapon states.
The third group consisting of the five nuclear-weapon states, with some
variation, argues that the nuclear disarmament issue is essentially a matter of
security. This idea is reflected in paragraph 3 of the Draft Final Document, in
which the Conference reaffirms the urgent need for the nuclear-weapon states to
implement the steps leading to nuclear disarmament agreed, “in a way that
promotes international stability, peace and security, and based on the principle of
undiminished and increased security for all.” Traditionally, the emphasis on the
security dimension has been strongly argued for and treated as the central element
to take into account when discussing nuclear disarmament.
The challenge here is how to reconcile these different positions among the
three groups. First, the first and second groups should start consultations in order
to reconcile the different positions among non-nuclear-weapon states. In particular,
Japan and Finland, which support both joint statements by Austria and Australia,
should initiate the efforts to reconcile the different positions.
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The states in the second group will have to explain their security stance on the
basis of their geopolitical situations. Then they should make efforts to reduce the
role of nuclear weapons in their national security policy. That is what President
Obama strongly supports, and he not only tries to do so in the U.S. nuclear policy
and strategy but also asks other countries to do so. The states in the second group
should ask the nuclear-weapon states under whose protection they are to take the
policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, reduce the alert level of nuclear
weapons, and take other actions to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their
national security policy.
By taking these measures, the difference between states in the first and second
groups would be narrowed gradually. In the areas where the second-group states
prioritize the humanitarian dimension over the security dimension, the states in the
first and second groups together could ask the nuclear-weapon states to take
measures to reduce the role of nuclear weapons.
4 How to Advance Nuclear Disarmament
The fourth challenge is how to advance nuclear disarmament, that is, which
process we should take to achieve a world without nuclear weapons. From the
discussion at the Conference, we can identify four kinds of processes. First, a
comprehensive nuclear weapons convention that includes a comprehensive
program for nuclear abolition through several phases within pre-determined
timelines has been traditionally argued for by the group of non-aligned members
(NAM).
Second, international NGOs have recently proposed a treaty banning nuclear
weapons that prohibits the use and possession of nuclear weapons even without
the participation of the nuclear-weapon states. The main motivation for this
proposal is the lack of the will by the nuclear-weapon states to start negotiation on
a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention.
Third, a framework agreement has been proposed consisting of a framework
treaty that provides for fundamental obligation for nuclear abolition and protocols
that stipulate concrete obligations for measures of nuclear disarmament. The UN
Secretary-General proposed this agreement in 2008, and it was included in the
2010 Final Document, as an agreement on a framework of separate mutually
reinforcing instruments.
Fourth, a step by step approach, which has been traditionally argued for mainly
by the nuclear-weapon states, and a building blocks approach proposed by 20 non-
nuclear-weapon states in 2014 that supplements a step by step approach and takes
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plural measures at the same time are now treated as almost one and the same idea.
They reject the first three options and argue for taking concrete measures for
nuclear disarmament one by one through multilateral, plurilateral, bilateral, or
unilateral measures.
The first option, a nuclear weapons convention, has been proposed for a long
time and would be the best option for the abolition of nuclear weapons. However,
the possibility of its negotiation commencing seems to be almost non-existent now.
The second option, which is proposed because the first option is virtually
impossible to start, emphasized the commencement to negotiation even without the
participation of the nuclear-weapon states. In this point, it seems to be easier to
start negotiation of a treaty that at first would prohibit only the use and possession
of nuclear weapons because the participants could be all non-nuclear-weapon
states. From a logical point of view, the proposal at first seems to have a high
chance of success. However, in the real world, the possibility of the negotiations
commencing is not very high, because nuclear weapons have political and strategic
significance quite different from weapons covered by the Anti-Personnel Land
Mine Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, so the logic behind these
two treaties would not apply in the case of nuclear weapons. In addition, so far no
single state has formally declared support for the treaty.
The third option also seems difficult to realize soon, but it seems easier than
the first and second options. The fourth option, which is mainly supported by the
nuclear-weapon states and the non-nuclear-weapon states under their extended
nuclear umbrellas, is currently the most influential option because they are most
directly connected with nuclear weapons states.
From these reasons, I would like to recommend taking a course that combines
options three and four. A framework agreement would consist of a framework
treaty and protocols. The framework treaty should stipulate a fundamental and
central obligation, and the protocols should include obligations on concrete
disarmament measures. The 2000 NPT Review Conference agreed “an unequivocal
undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of
their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament.” This is a political
undertaking by the nuclear-weapons states. Under a new framework treaty, the five
nuclear-weapon states should undertake a legal obligation to accomplish the total
elimination of nuclear weapons. That would be a fundamental and central
obligation under the framework treaty, but it would not include the timeframe for
the total elimination. On the other hand, protocols should take into account the
measures proposed by the building blocks approach.
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